

The Director of Central Intelligence

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Dear Vince,

My apologies for running off on you Wednesday night without even saying good-bye. I tried to pause long enough to do that but was under such heavy escort I could hardly turn around!


I found the day in Lexington most productive and enjoyable. I was particularly stimulated by the opportunity to visit with you and your students in your home. The lovely dinner was a particularly nice occasion to get to know some of your friends and friends of the intelligence community. It was a great opportunity for me to have a visit with Senator Gore. We have had a few professional contacts in his role on the Intelligence Oversight Board but never before have had an opportunity just to visit at leisure.

Despite the Iranian students, I thought the lecture audience was most receptive and their questions were excellent. All in all, it was fun to handle that situation but only because the campus authorities were so cooperative and effective.

I was embarrassed when I got back to find I had your note on S-2525 which had been milling around in the staff. I am enclosing a few points on the new charters to give you a capsule of our views on them here. Hope they will help.

Again, thanks for a great day, and look forward to seeing you in mid-June.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

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Enclosure

Miscellaneous Comments on Proposed Charter Legislation

-- New statutory charters for the Government's intelligence organization and capability is not a bad thing; such legislation could bring a much needed degree of clarity and confidence to the Intelligence Community.

-- It must be kept in mind that the new charters must present clear authority for intelligence activities in such a manner as to be understandable and workable; the mandate must be workable.

-- The legislation must not be so detailed as to stifle ingenuity, lead to an overly cautious mentality on the part of intelligence officers and organizations, or give rise to the situation whereby particular activities although not explicitly proscribed would be deemed to be restricted simply for lack of an explicit authorization (this is always a danger in attempting to be completely comprehensive and detailed in legislation).

-- The legislation must recognize that we are operating in a real world and that we have to deal with foreign individuals and organizations in intelligence matters; the legislation therefore should not be so explicit in attempting to govern such relationships so as to dry them up.

-- The legislation should not result in "micro-management" of the intelligence business.

-- Organizationally, legislation should continue to recognize that the Director--whether it be of "National Intelligence" or of "Central Intelligence"--must have an independent bureaucratic base from which to operate.

-- It is important that the legislation afford due recognition of the prerogatives of the Executive Branch in providing information to the Congress; in this regard, for example, provision for prior reporting to the Congress as to certain categories of activities may very well conflict with those prerogatives.

-- The legislation must continue to recognize that the Government must have the capability to conduct "special activities" in certain circumstances; moreover, the legislation should not--as S. 2525 arguably does--impose such detailed and extensive requirements on the initiation and conduct of special activities so as to almost completely diminish the possibility of maintaining the confidentiality of such activities.

-- It is certainly important that the charter legislation recognize, if not explicitly then certainly by implication, rights of U.S. citizens; care should be taken, however, to ensure that such recognition does not completely engulf the need to engage in counterintelligence and certain intelligence activities within the U.S. and regarding U.S. officials.

-- Efforts to legislate a listing of specific restrictions on activities, as S. 2525 does, can be extremely problematic; careful consideration should be given to whether this is either workable or appropriate.

-- Limitations, as to duration and techniques regarding counterintelligence and intelligence activities in the U.S., such as those contained in Title II of S. 2525, if they are to remain in the legislation, must be developed on the basis of practical considerations rather than mere theoretical views of what intelligence activities should be.

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